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This article focuses on the little-known arrival of the first group of Holocaust 
survivors in Canada in 1944. They arrived from Lisbon and came through the 
eﬀorts of the Canadian Jewish Congress. Congress Executive Director Saul Hayes 
spearheaded this refugee project. The author argues that, while few in number, 
eﬀorts to negotiate the entry of immigrants, and subsequent Jewish communal 
eﬀorts to absorb immigrant populations in Toronto, and reactions to the immigrants, 
were to prove paradigmatic predictors of communal management and reaction to 
much larger Holocaust survivor influxes after the war. While the article focuses on 
immigrant absorption in Toronto, it also discusses broader issues associated with 
this movement and the role played by the Yiddish press in reporting refugee arrival.
Cet article porte sur l’arrivée peu connue du premier groupe de survivants de 
l’Holocauste au Canada en 1944. Ils sont arrivés de Lisbonne grâce aux eﬀorts 
du Congrès juif canadien. Le directeur général du Congrès, Saul Hayes, a dirigé 
ce projet de réfugiés. L’auteur soutient que, bien que peu nombreux, les eﬀorts 
pour négocier l’entrée de ces immigrants, les eﬀorts communaux juifs subséquents 
à l’intégration des immigrants à Toronto, et les réactions aux immigrants étaient 
des prédicteurs paradigmatiques de la gestion communautaire et des réactions aux 
aﬄux beaucoup plus grands des survivants de l’Holocauste après la guerre. Bien que 
l’article se concentre sur l’intégration des immigrants à Toronto, il aborde également 
les questions plus larges associées à ce mouvement et le rôle joué par la presse yiddish 
en rapporter l’arrivée des réfugiés.
Mention 1944 to a Canadian reasonably versed in history - a group in short supply 
these days - and they will respond that “D-Day took place that year.” Certainly for 
Canadians living in 1944 who were anxiously scanning the headlines, D-Day marked 
an epochal moment: for the first time, the German army was caught between two 
foes. At last, after five long years of war, there was a sense that the enemy was on 
the defensive. This proved correct. Events on all battlefronts moved quickly. By 
December, the end of the war was clearly in sight as Axis troops fell back on every 
front. On a smaller but significant scale for those aﬀected, 1944 also marked a crucial 
turning point in the battle to ensure a steady flow of Jewish immigration and familial 
reunification. This cause served as a unifying point for Canadian Jewry during the first 
part of the 20th century. The constantly shifting parameters of Canadian immigration 
policy heightened communal tensions especially during the Holocaust years when 
uncertainty over the fate of relatives and landslayt loomed large. Participants in this 
struggle rightly perceived every immigration permit approval as a victory against 
long odds. And victories were few. This meant that every gain had to be savoured, 
and even overemphasized, by Jewish communal leaders.1
Seen against this backdrop of spasmodic success in breaching the wall of Canada’s 
immigration bureaucracy, the arrival of a significant number of Jewish refugees from 
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Lisbon in 1944 proved a vital watershed for three reasons. First, despite every eﬀort 
at obfuscation by Canadian immigration oﬃcials, the arrival of over 100 families of 
Jewish immigrants marked the first significant mass arrival of Jewish immigrants 
since the coming of the Ukrainian orphans over two decades before. Both these 
immigration movements had been negotiated by national Jewish organizations and 
required the Jewish community to ensure that none of the immigrants would, in 
the parlance of the day, “become public charges.” While it is vital to note that the 
number of Iberian refugees admitted fell far below the government’s secret quota 
of 200 families, the fact that political pressure compelled at least some bureaucratic 
response proved a key precedent to be further exploited in the postwar era by the 
Tailors, Furriers, and Orphans Immigration Projects.2 
Second, the Toronto Jewish community’s reception of these refugees presented 
a collection of attitudes, assumptions, and planning that would later characterize 
much of the organized postwar immigration to Canada. Indeed, immigrant reception 
prompted vital and lasting changes in the institutional fabric of the community. The 
fact that such a tiny group of refugees produced a disproportionately large eﬀect on 
the community testifies to the continued salience of immigration while providing a 
useful indicator of communal attitudes and assumptions about both immigrants and 
the process of acculturation.
Last, the small but key successes obtained by communal lobbyists in 1944 foreshadowed 
a much more confident and successful lobbying eﬀort in the succeeding decades. 
This is worthy of attention because the ability of Canadian Jewish organizational 
lobbyists to access government and significantly shape policy in some areas, especially 
but not exclusively limited to human rights, has vastly increased since the Second 
World War.
The origins of the Iberian immigration movement can be traced to the aftermath of 
the Bermuda Conference in April 1943. The Conference’s blatant failure to do anything 
significant for refugees in the midst of the war gave Canadian pro-refugee lobbyists 
a tiny but significant window of opportunity which they managed to exploit, albeit 
with great diﬃculty. The lobbyists argued that since Bermuda was an international 
conference, it was a matter for External Aﬀairs rather than Immigration. This 
approach sidelined the indomitably anti-Semitic Frederick Blair, tossing the issue 
into the lap of Prime Minister King, who also held the External Aﬀairs portfolio. 
Blair’s retirement soon after the lobbying eﬀorts began also stoked the slim hopes of 
the Canadian Jewish leaders crafting this new appeal to the Canadian government.3
This wedge of bureaucratic opportunism suﬃced to allow External Aﬀairs personnel 
to get a secret quota of 200 refugee families, the vast majority of whom were Jews, 
who had managed to reach Lisbon in neutral Portugal after often harrowing journeys 
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from Nazi territory. This article will focus on the 174 refugees from 69 families 
that arrived in Toronto between April and October 1944 as a basis for assessing 
the “Lisbon refugees” importance as precursors to further Jewish communal 
immigration lobbying, assumptions about immigrant acculturation and acceptance, 
and the continuing use of self-congratulatory language by a much more mature and 
entrenched Jewish community.4
The Lisbon Refugees’ arrival coincided with the final brushstrokes of Jewish 
communal professionalization in national and regional Jewish organizations in 
Toronto and Montreal. Indeed, the process of their arrival and acceptance served 
as a litmus test of professionalization. For example, it is hard to imagine that the 
lobbying eﬀort to bring in the Lisbon refugees could have succeeded before Saul 
Hayes assumed his position as Executive Director of the Canadian Jewish Congress 
in 1942. Trained at McGill Law School, Hayes possessed the language, personality, and 
connections to alternately correspond with, cajole, and badger Ottawa’s immigration 
bureaucracy in a manner they learned to respect. His sensitivity to the twists and 
turns of interdepartmental policy shifts and rivalries made him aware at a crucial 
juncture that the government needed to be reminded that the Jewish community 
stood behind its longstanding promise to ensure that no refugees became a public 
charge. Even more important, Hayes could explain why Jewish social service agencies 
were positioned to guarantee this pledge. Plus, given his experience with the abortive 
Vichy Orphans scheme, Hayes knew how this guarantee would be essential. He made 
the government well aware of these facts and it acceded to his requests in short order. 
Hayes then made sure, as will be demonstrated in more detail, to leverage his success 
by repeatedly reminding the Jewish social service agencies involved with the Lisbon 
refugees of Congress’ catalytic role in the refugee movement to the exclusion of any 
other factors. His intracommunal goal was to establish and maintain the hegemony 
of Congress as a national Jewish spokesagency.5
This Lisbon Refugees methodology served as a template for Hayes’ later work on 
behalf of what came to be called the Tailors’ and Furriers’ Projects. Once again, 
Hayes’ antennae picked up an opportunity in which his ability to act as a pipeline to 
the Ottawa bureaucracy could be used. Stunned by the immensity of the Holocaust, 
unions and manufacturers had put aside their diﬀerences to create an “immigration 
scheme” along the lines of those that brought European domestics and lumberjacks 
to Canada. Hayes got wind of these deliberations in the planning stage and adeptly 
moved in to oﬀer financial and logistical support while allowing the Projects to be 
“fronted” by the unions and owners. Hayes correctly detected an opportunity for 
Congress to gain traction with the labour unions, whose lack of aﬃliation had long 
proved a thorn in Congress’ side, thus furthering his claim that Congress spoke for 
all Canadian Jews. When the furriers and tailors began to arrive, Hayes muscled 
aside rival agencies such as the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society, and funded new 
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agencies, such as the Toronto oﬃce of the Canadian Overseas Garment Commission, 
to coordinate tailor and furrier absorption and settlement. Throughout the Tailors 
Project and, to a lesser degree, in the Furrier Project, Hayes sought to ensure that 
Congress “assume the lion’s share of responsibility and credit for being the eminence 
grise behind the tailors’ movement.”6
Each displaced agency was told in no uncertain terms that Congress would now take 
over its turf. At the same time, Hayes ensured that Congress’ role was always cited 
so that the owners and unions would be unable to take exclusive credit for a scheme 
into which they had put a great deal of eﬀort and funds. It is worth noting that, unlike 
the Lisbon Refugees situation, Hayes’ strategy ultimately proved unsuccessful. The 
reason for his failure was tellingly ironic: Hayes’ insistence on cementing Congress’ 
hegemony in postwar refugee immigration had led to such disruption in Toronto’s 
Jewish refugee absorption eﬀorts that the financial records of the Toronto oﬃce of 
the United Jewish Relief Agency, controlled by Hayes, could not be located. Without 
these, it was impossible to apply to the United Jewish Welfare Fund for an operating 
subsidy to run the oﬃce and thus finalize Congress’ control of immigrant absorption. 
Given this, it is hard to fault Hayes for his strategic choices despite Congress’ failure 
to ultimately assume hegemony over the Tailors and Furriers Projects.7
While the Lisbon Refugees situation provided Hayes with a means to publicize 
Congress’ role nationally, it oﬀered the United Jewish Welfare Fund of Toronto 
(UJWF) the same opportunity on a local level. Since its founding in 1937, UJWF 
wielded its power of the purse to relentlessly streamline Jewish social service agencies 
and eliminate duplication of services. Indeed, the refugees’ arrival would prove to be 
the first test of the newly formed Jewish Family and Child Services (JFCS), the result 
of the forced merger of the Jewish Welfare Bureau and the Jewish Children’s Bureau. 
JFCS was thoroughly professional, hiring only accredited social workers and applying 
the latest trends in the field. This would greatly aﬀect the approach of the agency’s 
workers to the refugees and aﬀect the language employed to record interactions.8
The Toronto end of the Lisbon Refugees movement was a testament to the eﬃciency 
of professional social service delivery and seamless coordination. Within three 
months of the last refugee’s arrival, practically all the men were gainfully employed, 
all the adults were enrolled in English classes, and the students enrolled in public 
schools were receiving Jewish educations. The UJWF touted these achievements in 
its annual campaign drive. Its associated agencies, particularly the JFCS, did the same 
- and for good reason. By October 1944, every reader of the Yiddish press - a majority 
of Toronto Jews - knew a great deal about the Holocaust. As Rebecca Margolis 
has demonstrated, Yiddish press coverage of the Holocaust was significant for its 
detail and depth and for the fact that readers believed that genocide was possible. 
Yiddish press reports following the liberation of Majdanek in July 1944 confirmed 
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the worst fears of those who yet doubted the enormity of the destruction. Those who 
read the daily installments of Rabbi Hirschsprung’s The Vale of Tears in Montreal’s 
Keneder Adler would now see, if they hadn’t yet heard from other sources, that his 
story of escape was the exception rather than the rule. Yet, Canadian Jews still hoped 
that somehow, as long as no definite news of their death had been received, their 
European relatives were still alive.9
The presence of the Lisbon Refugees therefore represented a coalescence of all the 
hopes and fears of Toronto (and Canadian) Jewry. This remnant might well represent 
many others who had survived. They had to be helped in every way. This explains 
the attention they received and why the quality of their reception was placed under 
the communal microscope. Certainly, Toronto Jews marshaled all the volunteers 
they could muster, and they spared no eﬀort in planning or payments to assist the 
refugees. Despite a serious shortage of housing, the newcomers were soon settled 
in houses and apartments. Children were quickly enrolled in local public schools 
and in afternoon Jewish education programs. Mothers and fathers attended English 
classes, and jobs were found for the refugee breadwinners. Social workers met with 
the families to help them adjust to Canadian life. By early January, the vast majority 
of the newcomers were beginning to resume the patterns of normal life. Of course, 
it was all but inevitable that some families slipped through the net. The Kohn family 
had fled Milan for Tangiers after Mussolini singed the Pact of Steel with Hitler. They 
made their way to Portugal and were accepted into the Lisbon Refugee Scheme 
which settled them in Toronto. JIAS workers, hoping to assist their absorption, found 
them a host family. But the family took the Kohns to a hotel and left them there 
without a forwarding address. Despite this, the Kohn parents soon found work and 
their daughter Magda quickly caught up in school through the eﬀorts of a helpful 
teacher and classmates.10
Successfully settling the Lisbon Refugees was no small accomplishment; this relatively 
small contingent strained the UJWF’s social service agency apparatus to its limit. There 
were no houses left for future refugees, the JFCS social workers were swamped by their 
increased caseload, and it was impossible to hire additional workers given the surge 
in demand for their services created by the war. The refugees’ arrival had boosted 
JFCS workload by almost one-third between June and November 1944. The settlement 
eﬀort cost $24,000 - a huge sum in those days. Of course, no one complained, and 
refugee settlement would become a key area of UJWF campaign allocations going 
forward, but all of these factors foreshadowed the challenges that would face the 
community when the war ended and Canada’s long barred gates began to open.11
However, and this is the crucial point, one would not suspect the existence of any 
of these underlying issues by reading the public pronouncements of the Congress, 
UJWF, or their associated social welfare agencies. These reports were uniformly 
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upbeat and stressed the key role of their agency in the refugee movement. The 
report of the JFCS to the UJWF on the handling of the Lisbon Refugees is a case 
in point. After stating that “we are regarded by them [the refugees] as their parent 
organization: they consult us in all manner of problems,” the report emphasized that 
“they receive from us professional case work service to meet their individual needs 
and requirements and make their adjustment to Canadian life with the minimum 
amount of tension and conflict.”12
The language of the Report underscores the observations of historians who have 
remarked on both the “paternalism” and the “patronizing attitude” to the refugees 
manifested by the social agency employees. In addition, the belief that these refugees, 
given their persecuted backgrounds, could simply be expected to adjust to Canadian 
life with minimal diﬃculty forms a recurrent theme in refugee resettlement 
eﬀectively demonstrated by Frank Bialystok and Rebecca Margolis. Despite having 
access to extensive information about the destruction of European Jewry, professional 
leaders in general - and social agency workers in particular - downplayed the 
eﬀect of the events on survivors. This reflected a key intraethnic educational and 
acculturational gap between generations. Though the Yiddish press discussed and 
featured stories of the refugees, the English language Jewish press was silent. Its 
major voice, the Canadian Jewish Chronicle, did not publish a single survivor story 
between 1944 and 1948. Many of these generally university-trained professionals 
were somewhat aloof from the immigrant experience. This disconnect can be traced 
to the eﬀect of professionalism in both fundraising and social service delivery and 
supervision in the Jewish community that began in the interwar years. Simply put, 
immigrant absorption into the community was to be rapid and relatively uneventful; 
social workers would deal with whatever issues arose. The Lisbon Refugees only 
diﬀered from other movements because of the complexity of their migration - not 
because of the persecutions they had endured.13
This became the template going forward for dealing with - and advertising - how 
Congress and other social service agencies managed the steadily increasing flow of 
European refugees. For example, published descriptions of the Orphans Project, in 
which the Canadian Jewish Congress coordinated the movement of 1,116 orphans to 
Canada in 1947 were uniformly positive. Certainly, this was required, not only for 
public relations purposes, but because Congress had guaranteed that none of the 
orphans would become a public charge, and it was vital that the government not 
know the myriad challenges the Project faced on the ground. Here was one obvious 
parallel with the Lisbon Refugees movement. 
The other parallel was far more systemic. Both movements were complicated by 
social worker and public misunderstanding of the scale of the Holocaust and its 
impact on immigrants. Not only could possible foster parents not understand why 
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children under 15 were a rare commodity among the orphans, but they expected 
their charges to act more or less like “normal teenagers” after a short period of 
adjustment. Perhaps this was understandable given the unprecedented nature of the 
Holocaust and the fact that twenty years had passed since the influx of the Russian 
orphans, the last major Jewish population influx of this type. But the paternalism that 
also greeted this movement is paralleled by that associated with the Lisbon Refugees 
movement. Frank Bialystok observes that it apparently stemmed from “the feeling 
[of the Holocaust] that [was] not that diﬀerent from earlier Jewish refugees who 
had to flee persecution before and immediately after World War I.”14 This certainly 
explains Saul Hayes’ comment on a “shipment” of orphans: “at times we make plans 
for certain children and we find they make other plans. The most diﬃcult thing in 
the world is to convince these orphaned children that the plans they have made will 
not be accepted. Let us hope these children [in this group of orphans] do not have set 
ideas.” This statement reflected the leadership’s plans to shunt most of these teens 
into the workforce as soon as possible, regardless of their deep desire to continue 
their interrupted educations. These sentiments could also be found among those who 
actually worked with the orphans as well. One member of the Toronto Committee 
for European Youth asked: “are we not pampering and overprotecting them?”.15 
A similar lack of empathy and understanding greeted the considerable number of 
workers brought in under the various “Immigration Projects” organized by the trade 
unions. Congress and the unions did a great deal to organize these movements, to 
convince the government that workers were needed, and to find one year’s guar-
anteed employment for a large number of immigrants in order to satisfy the gov-
ernment’s condition that no one become a public charge. But upon arrival, these 
immigrants found a desperate shortage of homes and little understanding of what 
they had experienced during the Holocaust. When some of the new arrivals men-
tioned their horrific lack of food, they were told “we had rationing here too,” while 
other members of the community complained about how demanding the new arriv-
als were. As Goldberg and Bialystok have clearly demonstrated, frustrated survivors 
turned inwards to each other for solace, catalyzing a lengthy estrangement between 
survivors and the community at large.16
The average observer of the community would have seen few of these tensions. 
Granted, the challenge of finding homes for those who arrived in the various immi-
gration schemes was well known and advertised through the lengthy public cam-
paigns for housing and assistance. But with respect to the more serious failings of 
communal organizations in meeting refugee needs, the 1950 Palevsky Report on 
these failings was carefully hushed up after it graphically revealed a number of areas 
in which immigration settlement work and professionalism in Toronto was seriously 
lacking. The report was only rescued from oblivion more than 40 years later by his-
torians in the field.17
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The decision to admit the Lisbon Refugees was the first sign that the “post-Blair” 
immigration regime would be slightly more amenable to outside pressures to open 
Canada’s tightly barred gates to Jewish refugees. Having read over 5,000 pages and 13 
years of Blair memos and letters, one notes the pleasurable punctiliousness colour-
ing Blair’s refusals of admittance to Canada to Jews who asked for admission. Blair 
reveled in flourishing his bureaucratic latitude and never hesitated to throw in his 
personal opinions of Jews for good measure. His successor, Arthur Jolliﬀe - even 
when he ruled against admission - wrote in softer tones, and the various communal 
delegations came away with the impression they were being given a sincere hearing. 
Certainly, the expeditious way in which the government approved the Tailors’ and 
Furriers’ Projects and the tone of Jolliﬀe’s correspondence on the file confirmed that 
a sea change was underway in the Department. 
This project would provide a preview, in a small way, of a much greater change in 
the ability of Canadian Jews to get governments to listen to their communal con-
cerns. In 1943, the Bermuda Conference made Canadian Jews brutally aware of their 
minuscule amount of power and influence. In the postwar world, Canadian Jewish 
lobbying evolved and became more sophisticated, subtle, and successful, first in the 
field of human rights and later in letting the government know about certain issues 
of particular importance to the Jewish community. It is interesting that in July 2017, 
when the Canadian Jewish community’s designated lobby group - the Centre for 
Israel and Jewish Aﬀairs (CIJA) - quickly obtained the reversal of a ban on Israe-
li wine produced in the West Bank being sold in Ontario liquor stores, it issued a 
communiqué whose matter-of-fact language indicated a confidence in its ability to 
access and persuade government oﬃcials. Hayes and his contemporaries might well 
have envied this self-assurance.18 Their significant successes with the immigration 
schemes and the large percentage of Jews among postwar refugees in general cer-
tainly reflected the small beginnings of a larger trend.19
Given this perspective, 1944 proved to be a “preview point” not merely of the end 
of the war in Europe, but of the relationships between Canadian Jews and the Ho-
locaust, including the politics, communal reception, and social work aspects of the 
Holocaust survivors’ settlement in Canada. Those who read the news carefully cer-
tainly knew that an enormous massacre of European Jewry was taking place. But the 
unprecedented Nazi mechanization of genocide only became apparent with the lib-
eration of Majdanek, a timeline that makes it problematic to blame Toronto Jews for 
not fully recognizing the scope of the slaughter or fully appreciating the traumatized 
background of the Lisbon Refugees. However in later years, as a number of studies 
have shown, it is challenging to explain the deep-rooted refusal to understand the 
diﬀerent mentality of Holocaust survivors that underlay and undermined the con-
siderable institutional generosity accompanying the Orphans, Furriers, and Tailors 
Projects. This paternalism of Congress and the social workers would persist well past 
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the immediate postwar years. It would take the Eichmann Trial in the early 1960s 
to truly convince Canadian Jews that the survivors had passed through a uniquely 
horrific experience. In sum, 1944 marked an important preview of a decade and a 
half of the communal encounter with the Holocaust and also of the first indications 
that Jewish communal lobbying with the Canadian government could produce the 
desired results. 
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